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"tsai tsung sheng"的相关文件
显示项目 1-11 / 11 (共1页)
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| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T18:06:56Z |
Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition
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Omiya, Shungo; Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; TSUNG-SHENG TSAI |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T18:06:55Z |
Reputation versus information: The delegation policy when the principal has reputational concerns
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Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; TSUNG-SHENG TSAI |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T15:38:58Z |
Ideologies, status quo, and parties�� outside options in parliamentary politics
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Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Yang, C. C.; TSUNG-SHENG TSAI |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T15:22:10Z |
On the internal revenue service's service and enforcement
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Yang, C. C.; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T15:22:10Z |
Judicial torture as a screening device
|
Chen, Kong-Pin; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; TSUNG-SHENG TSAI |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T14:56:55Z |
Delegating the decision-making authority to terminate a sequential project
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Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T08:13:29Z |
Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: The role of uncertainty
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Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Yang, C. C. |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T06:29:14Z |
Optimal organization in a sequential investment problem with the principal's cancellation option
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Tamada, Yasunari; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng |
| 臺大學術典藏 |
2018-09-10T06:29:14Z |
Optimal Contract for Ambitious Team Workers
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Chen, Kong-Pin; Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; TSUNG-SHENG TSAI; ������; ���R�t |
| 國立政治大學 |
2010-11 |
On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information
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Tsai,Tsung-Sheng ; Yang,C. C. |
| 國立政治大學 |
2010-02 |
Minimum Winning verus Oversized Coalitions in Public Finance: The Role of Uncertainty
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Tsai,Tsung-Sheng; Yang,C. C. |
显示项目 1-11 / 11 (共1页)
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